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A Study in Judicial Sleight of Hand: Did Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co. Eradicate the Presumption
Against Preemption?
Susan Raeker-Jordan*

I. INTRODUCTION
Two years have passed since the United States Supreme Court
decided Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,1 a preemption decision
through which the Supreme Court appeared to work significant changes
in preemption jurisprudence.2 There has been some discussion3 of the
opinion and only recently some detailed analysis of its long-term effects
on the doctrine of preemption.4 Because of the potential for Geier’s
having significant impact, this Article will dissect the majority opinion
and then examine the Court’s subsequent preemption decisions for
indications of Geier’s impact.
As a necessary first step and as part of its primary thesis, this Article
will demonstrate how the Court in Geier departed from decades of its
preemption jurisprudence without a sound. Rather, the Court proceeded
about its business according to what it termed “ordinary” preemption
principles that it neither detailed nor employed in reaching its decision. It

*

Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. I would like to thank Adjunct
Professor David Raeker-Jordan for his helpful comments on previous drafts of this Article. I also
thank him and Professor John J. Capowski for their generous willingness to serve as sounding boards
for my ideas at various times during the writing of this Article. I thank Widener University School
of Law for research support and, as always, Paula Heider, Kim Schrack, and Shannon Whitson for
their patient and pleasant clerical assistance.
1. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
2. One commentator has said “Geier represents a seismic shift in the Court’s preemption
doctrine.” Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967,
1012 (2002).
3. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 2; M. Stuart Madden, Federal Preemption of Inconsistent
State Safety Obligations, 21 PACE L. REV.103 (2000); Mark Tushnet, Globalization and Federalism
in a Post-Printz World, 36 TULSA L.J. 11 (2000); The Supreme Court 1999 Term: Leading Cases,
Federal Preemption of State Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 339 (2000) (hereinafter “Supreme Court:
Leading Cases”).
4. See generally Davis, supra note 2; Joseph Mulherin, Note, Geier v. American Honda
Motor Company, Inc.: Has the Supreme Court Extended the Pre-emption Doctrine Too Far?, 21 J.
NAT’L. ASS’N. ADMIN. L. JUDGES 173 (2001).
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thus worked a judicial sleight of hand, by reaching a result it desired on
the facts of the case, which it should not have reached with preemption
law as it existed. Rather than up-end preemption jurisprudence with a
change in the law, then, it simply glossed over the content of that law,
never defining the applicable contours, and reached its desired result
based on “ordinary” (although undisclosed) principles.
More specifically and comprising the other part of the Article’s
thesis, this Article contends that, despite the cautions urged by
commentators,5 the Supreme Court in Geier jumped headlong into the
“obstacle” conflict preemption abyss and demonstrated in a powerful and
paradigmatic way the danger that obstacle or obstruction-of-purposes
preemption poses to state law when judges are unrestrained by anything
but their own policy predilections. The five-member majority
accomplished its apparent goal of preemption in the case by abandoning
the long-standing presumption against preemption6 and the concomitant
requirement that Congress’s intent to preempt be clear, and it thereby
removed any protections the presumption provided to federalism
principles, state tort law, and Congress’s own preemptive intentions.7 In
fact, in numerous statements that reveal its approach, the Court evidences
5. See, e.g., Philip H. Corboy & Todd A. Smith, Federal Preemption of Product Liability
Law: Federalism and the Theory of Implied Preemption, 15 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 435 (1992); Betsy
J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV.
559 (1997); Susan Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption that Never Was: Pre-emption
Doctrine Swallows the Rule, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1379 (1998); David E. Seidelson, Express Federal
Preemption Provisions, State Law Actions for Damages, Congress, and the Supreme Court: A
Penitent Seeks Redemption, 58 LA. L. REV. 145 (1997); KENNETH STARR, ET AL., AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, THE LAW OF PREEMPTION: A REPORT OF THE APPELLATE JUDGES CONFERENCE
(1991); Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69
(1988).
6. Justice Stevens, along with Justices Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, Geier, 529 U.S. at
886, dissented because he felt in part that the majority “wrong[ly] characterize[d] its rejection of the
presumption against pre-emption . . . as ‘ordinary experience-proved principles of conflict preemption.’” Id. at 888 (quoting id. at 874). Justice Stevens also observed that “the Court simply
ignores the presumption” and argued that “in view of the important principles upon which the
presumption is founded, . . . rejecting it in this manner is profoundly unwise.” Id. at 906-07.
7. Beyond the scope of this Article is whether the presumption against preemption is
warranted at all, either by policy or by the Constitution. I find more persuasive the arguments in
Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000), regarding the non obstante provision of
Article VI, than those in Viet D. Dinh, Regulatory Compliance as a Defense to Products Liability:
Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085 (2000), focusing on the “Constitution’s text
and structure” and “substantive principles of federalism.” Id. at 2097. Professor Nelson’s article
contains a major caveat that is particularly significant in a case like Geier, which involves a statute
with a savings clause. He stated, “The non obstante clause instructs courts that in the absence of
other indications, they should not automatically assume that Congress intends to avoid contradicting
state laws. But if Congress does give other indications, courts do not have to ignore them.” Id. at 294
(emphases added). Even though in his view the presumption against preemption is improper under
Article VI, when Congress employs a savings provision, then the presumption may apply. But
indicative of the Supreme Court’s dramatic shift in doctrine in Geier, the Court ignored the
presumption against preemption even in a case involving a crystal-clear savings clause.
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a predisposition toward preemption rather than a presumption against it
and employs obstacle preemption to effectuate that predisposition.8 The
Geier Court, although further muddling long-standing preemption
doctrine, seemed nonetheless determined to make it much easier for
judicial preemption9 to trump even clear congressional enactments that
explicitly save state law from federal law override.
The purpose of this Article, then, is to demonstrate in detail what is
wrong with the Court’s preemption doctrine as styled in Geier, in
particular what is wrong with the implied “obstacle” sort of conflict
preemption.10 One must of necessity use the “airbag dispute”11 in the
case as a vehicle for illustrating the doctrine’s failings and for further
illustrating how much further afield the Court went from good rules and
toward ones detrimental to state tort law and federalism principles. The
real test of the Article’s thesis, though, comes from the analysis of
preemption decisions in the two years since Geier. For all of these
reasons, this Article in Part II will first briefly set out the basic
preemption rules as historically recognized. Part III equally briefly
provides the needed context of the airbag controversy. Parts IV and V
contain the bulk of the discussion, with Part IV analyzing the Supreme
Court’s approach in Geier and the consequences of employing that
approach. Part V will examine developments since Geier and conclude
that subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court do not evidence the
elimination of the presumption against preemption (and its clarity
requirement), at least in name. At the same time, however, those
decisions demonstrate the disarray in preemption doctrine because they
do not debunk the assertion that Geier expanded obstacle conflict
preemption as a powerful form of judicial preemption by its eschewing
of the application of the presumption against preemption in a case where
the presumption should apply.

8. For a similar charge, see Davis, supra note 2, at 1013 (stating that “[p]reemption analysis
is now organized not only to prefer federal law, but to presume its operation to the exclusion of state
law that has even a minimal effect on the accomplishment of federal objectives”), 968 (“It is
inescapable: there is a presumption in favor of preemption.”), 971 (arguing that “the Court’s
preemption analysis has, in effect, created a presumption in favor of preemption, contrary to the
Court’s oft-quoted dicta that there is a presumption against preemption of historic state police
powers”). Another commentator called the Geier Court’s “method of decisionmaking . . . essentially
a federal law preference rule” that shows a “strong preference for preemption.” Supreme Court:
Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 345-46.
9. By this I mean those instances in which courts are implying preemption from legislation
that does not clearly and expressly preempt state law.
10. For a general critique of implied “obstacle” conflict preemption, see Nelson, supra note
7, at 265-90 (concluding that “obstacle” implied preemption can be justified neither as a doctrine of
constitutional law nor as one of statutory interpretation).
11. See infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
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II. PREEMPTION
In many cases, the Supreme Court has described its preemption
doctrine in various ways, but the basics of its taxonomy of preemption
can be captured in the following quote from the Court:
It is well established that within constitutional limits Congress may preempt state authority by so stating in express terms. Absent explicit preemptive language, Congress’ intent to supersede state law altogether
may be found from a “scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive as
to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it,” because “the Act of Congress may touch a
field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject.” . . . Even where Congress has not entirely displaced state
regulation in a specific area, [known as “field” preemption,] state law is
pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Such
a conflict arises when “compliance with both federal and state
regulations is a physical impossibility,” or where state law “stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
12
and objectives of Congress.”

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, in its opinion in Geier v. Honda Motor Co.,13 identified in the
following way how federal law can preempt state law: “by express preemption, by ‘field’ pre-emption (in which Congress regulates the field
‘so extensively that [it] clearly intends the subject area to be controlled
only by federal law’), and by implied or conflict pre-emption, which
applies when a state law conflicts with a federal statute or regulation.”14
Later, the court of appeals more clearly defined how implied conflict
preemption could occur: “[i]mplied conflict pre-emption occurs ‘where it
is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal
requirements, . . . or where state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.’”15 The D.C. Court of Appeals’s articulation of preemption
conformed to that of the Supreme Court. The second kind of implied
conflict preemption, or “obstacle” conflict preemption, is the one the

12. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S.
190, 203-04 (1983) (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
(1982) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963), and Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
67 (1941))).
13. 166 F.3d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
14. Id. at 1237.
15. Id. at 1242 (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995)).
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Supreme Court employed in Geier and the one with which this Article
mainly deals.16
There is more to the doctrine than just the categories, however, and
the D.C. Court of Appeals immediately recognized that fact when it
added:
[t]he Supreme Court has identified two presumptions that courts must
consider when invoking the doctrine of preemption. First, in areas
where States have exercised their historic police powers (such as the
health and safety of their citizens), courts must start with a presumption
against preemption, absent a “clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”
Second, in every pre-emption case, “the purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touchstone.”17

The D.C. Court of Appeals correctly identified the presumption
against preemption and the clarity requirement that goes with it, in cases
involving areas of health and safety that the states have traditionally
occupied.18 All of this is standard preemption doctrine,19 as articulated by
the Supreme Court over the course of many decades.20
In order to analyze what the Supreme Court has done in its
application of preemption doctrine in Geier, however, one must first
understand the substantive federal and state law involved in the case. At
bottom, the issue in Geier was whether a federal traffic safety act “preempts a state common-law tort action in which the plaintiff claims that
the defendant auto manufacturer, who is in compliance with [a 1984
federal safety standard promulgated pursuant to the safety act], should

16. I have elsewhere undertaken a more expansive critique of this form of preemption. See
Raeker-Jordan, supra note 5.
17. Geier, 166 F.3d at 1238 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S 218, 230 (1947) and Retail Clerks Int’l Assoc. v.
Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963))).
18. This idea goes back at least as far as Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902), in which the
Court stated, “It should never be held that Congress intends to supercede or by its legislation
suspend the exercise of the police powers of the states, even when it may do so, unless its purpose to
effect that result is clearly manifested.” Id. at 148, quoted in Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 537
(1912).
19. For a hornbook discussion of preemption, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-28 to -32 (3d ed. 2000).
20. In his dissent, Justice Stevens recognized this history of the presumption:
Because of the role of States as separate sovereigns in our federal system, we have long
presumed that state laws – particularly those, such as the provision of tort remedies to
compensate for personal injuries, that are within the scope of the States’ historic police
powers – are not to be pre-empted by a federal statute unless it is the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress to do so.
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 894 (2000) (emphasis added). He elsewhere
referenced “our repeated emphasis on the importance of the presumption against pre-emption . . . .”
Id. at 906. For a fuller discussion of this history and preemption doctrine, see Raeker-Jordan, supra
note 5, at 1382-1423.
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nonetheless have equipped a 1987 automobile with airbags.”21 In taking
up this question, the Court waded into an area with much history.
III. THE AIRBAG DISPUTE
The “airbag dispute” describes the years-long debate in the courts
and in the commentary over the very question the Court addressed in
Geier: whether Congress in the 1966 National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act22 (the “Safety Act” or “Act”) preempted, either expressly or
impliedly, state common-law tort actions for damages based on a
manufacturer’s failure to equip an automobile with an airbag. Key
provisions in the debate include the purpose section. Congress wrote that
“[t]he purpose of this chapter is to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and
injuries resulting from traffic accidents. Therefore it is necessary . . . to
prescribe motor vehicle safety standards for motor vehicles and motor
vehicle equipment in interstate commerce . . . .”23 Congress defined those
standards as “minimum standards for motor vehicle performance, or
motor vehicle equipment performance. . . .”24
Section 1392 of the Act supplied a preemption provision:
Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under
this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State
shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with
respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any
safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such
vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal
standard.25

21. Geier, 529 U.S. at 865.
22. 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30169 (2002). The statute was previously codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
1381-1431, and most of the case law, including the United States Supreme Court’s opinions in Geier
and Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 115 S. Ct. 1483 (1995), cites the sections from that prior
codification. See, e.g., Geier, 529 U.S. at 865 (“We, like the courts below and the parties, refer to the
pre-1994 version of the statute throughout the opinion.”). For clarity and consistency, this Article
will also refer to the pre-1994 statutory text, because although Congress made some changes on reenactment, “the stated purpose of the [re-enactment of the] statute was to revise, codify, and enact
the[] law[] ‘without substantive change.’” Ralph Nader & Joseph A. Page, Automobile-Design
Liability and Compliance with Federal Standards, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 415, 416 n.2 (1996)
(quoting Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745 § 1 (1994)).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1381.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1391(2) (emphasis added). The statute as amended provides the following
definition: “‘motor vehicle safety standard’ means a minimum standard for motor vehicle or motor
vehicle equipment performance.” 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(9) (2002).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d). As amended, that section reads:
When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political
subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the
same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the
standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter.
49 U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1) (2002).
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This section does not settle the preemption question, however, since
there exists ambiguity in the word “standard.” It could be read by some
to include state tort actions in which the fact finder finds an automobile
defective for its failure to have an airbag, and if that tort “standard” were
not identical to the federal standard, it would be preempted under this
section.
Further complicating the preemption analysis, however, is section
1397(k) of the Act, which provides that “compliance with any Federal
motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not
exempt any person from any liability under common law.”26 Together,
these four provisions help to indicate the preemptive intent of Congress.
The final item in the mix is the federal safety standard that adopted a
phased-in approach to mandatory airbag installation, meaning that for a
number of years before they were required to install airbags,
manufacturers were given the option of choosing which form of passive
restraint system to install. 27 The state tort liability question arose when
people were allegedly injured due to the absence of an airbag in an
automobile that was manufactured before the date of mandatory
installation. The preemption question arose because manufacturers
argued that the phase-in itself was the exclusive method by which
Congress intended to achieve safety, preempting state tort law’s attempt
to require airbag installation through the imposition of damage awards.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT TAKES UP GEIER
Ultimately, the Supreme Court impliedly preempted the state tort
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k). Currently that section provides that “[c]ompliance with a motor
vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt any person from liability at
common law.” 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e) (2002).
27. In a prior article, I described the scheme in more detail: prior to the date when airbag
installation would be mandated,
manufacturers could comply with Standard 208 in one of three ways: they could install
either full airbag protection, frontal-only airbag protection, or a lap and shoulder belt
system. The standard required that cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1989, but
before September 1, 1996, be equipped with a passive restraint system for both front
seating positions (driver and right passenger). Between September 1, 1996, and August
31, 1997, manufacturers were still required to install passive restraint systems for both
front seating positions, but now the standard required that ninety-five percent of each
manufacturer’s total production of cars be equipped with airbags. Finally, Standard 208
required that all cars manufactured on or after September 1, 1997, be equipped with air
bags at both the driver’s and front right passenger’s seating positions.
Raeker-Jordan, supra note 5, at 1449 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2002)). Some of these
requirements were mandated by Congress in 49 U.S.C. § 30127(b)(1) (2002). In making these
changes, Congress nonetheless made clear that “[t]his section and amendments to Standard 208
made under this section may not be construed as indicating an intention by Congress to affect any
liability of a motor vehicle manufacturer under applicable law related to vehicles with or without
inflatable restraints.” 49 U.S.C. § 30127(f)(2).
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action that the plaintiff had brought in Geier, concluding that the state
law would obstruct the purposes of the federal statute and regulations.28
But the Court took a circuitous route to that conclusion, which this part
will detail. It should have been difficult for the Court to take such a
complicated route to implied preemption, though, considering the lack of
any articulated preemption principles such as those outlined above to
guide the majority’s reasoning. This section therefore begins with a
discussion of this failure of rule delineation before proceeding to more
detailed discussions of the express and implied preemption issues.
It is worth noting at the outset that the Supreme Court had ample
lower court precedent to assist its decision making on the preemption
question, since numerous state and federal courts had addressed the
question under the Safety Act.29 The Court itself observed that “[s]everal
state courts have held . . . that neither the Act’s express pre-emption nor
[the federal airbag safety standard] pre-empts a ‘no airbag’ tort suit. All
of the Federal Circuit Courts that have considered the question, however,
have found pre-emption.”30 But in itself finding implied preemption, and
agreeing with most of the lower federal courts, the Court appeared to
reach its conclusion without reference to preemption doctrine that has
been rather elaborately articulated over many years and that the lower
courts had set out and attempted to follow; in short, the nation’s highest
court never said exactly what rules it was following, enabling it to do
essentially whatever it wanted without having to justify the result as
soundly based on the law. In addition, the Supreme Court’s opinion and
approach illustrates both how courts have historically paid lip service to
portions of the doctrine without actually heeding it and how that lack of
adherence endangers state law and federalism principles in the process.
Most blatantly, the Supreme Court’s five-member majority ignored31
the long-standing32 presumption against preemption and the “clear and
manifest” requirement in favor of a never-defined set of “preemption
28. 529 U.S. at 886.
29. For a listing and discussion of many of the cases, see Raeker-Jordan, supra note 5, at
1450-67.
30. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 866 (2000) (citations omitted).
31. One could argue that the Court recognized the presumption later in the opinion when it
said that it “accept[ed] the dissent’s basic position that a court should not find pre-emption too
readily in the absence of clear evidence of a conflict . . . .” Id. at 885 (citation omitted). But that
argument is weak; this statement was tucked into the end of a long opinion in which the Court had
already reached a decision. The majority at most gave an empty nod to the presumption, as
evidenced by its finishing its sentence this way: “for the reasons set out above we find such evidence
[of conflict] here.” Id.
32. One commentator has observed that the phrase “presumption against preemption” itself
first appeared in a 1985 case. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 24 n.79 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985)). The concept of the presumption, however, has been around for
some time. See Raeker-Jordan, supra note 5, at 1384-1406; see also supra note 18.
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principles” to which the Court obliquely referred again and again. It is
difficult to analyze what the Court has done, since it never explains
which principles it is using; the Court repeats a staggering ten times the
phrase “ordinary pre-emption principles”33 as if the phrase is selfexplanatory. The five-member majority is thereby able to preempt state
tort law when it could not have done so had it employed the doctrine it
espoused for decades.
The Court first employed the phrase “ordinary pre-emption
principles” when discussing the decision below of the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.34 The Supreme Court stated that the
court of appeals “found . . . that, under ordinary pre-emption principles,
the [National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety] Act . . . pre-empted the
lawsuit.”35 In its decision and as noted above,36 the court of appeals
indeed articulated those principles: it listed the types of preemption,
noted that the presumption against preemption plays a part when state
safety laws are at issue, and recognized the presumption that the purpose
of Congress is the “ultimate touchstone” in any analysis. By its citation
to and quotation of prior Supreme Court opinions, the court of appeals
was invoking decades-old preemption doctrine and what should be
considered “ordinary pre-emption principles.”
When the Supreme Court cited the lower court for its reasoning
under those principles, however, it did not include the court of appeals’s
recitation of types of preemption or of the presumptions.37 Considering
that the court of appeals decision occupied only eight pages of the
reporter, the Supreme Court’s citation to all of the opinion except the one
page that contained the relevant “principles” takes on added significance
in a study charging the Court with engaging in a sleight of hand.38
33. See, e.g., 529 U.S. at 866, 869, 870 (employing the phrase twice without more
explanation), 871, 872, 874, 886 (changing the formulation to say instead “ordinary principles of
pre-emption”). Elsewhere the Court, just as generally, called them “well-established pre-emption
principles.” Id. at 873. In other places the Court used nearly identical phrases such as “the ordinary
working of conflict pre-emption principles,” id. at 869, “ordinary conflict pre-emption principles,”
id. at 871, and “ordinary experience-proved principles of conflict pre-emption.” Id. at 874.
34. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 166 F.3d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
35. Geier, 529 U.S. at 866 (emphasis added).
36. See supra notes 13-15, 17 and accompanying text.
37. The Court wrote, “[The court of appeals] found that those claims conflicted with [the
federal safety standard], and that, under ordinary pre-emption principles, the Act consequently preempted the lawsuit. The Court of Appeals thus affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. 166 F.3d
1236, 1238-1243 (CADC [sic] 1999).” Geier, 529 U.S. at 866. The Court’s citation to the first page
of the lower court’s opinion and to pages 1238-1243 omits page 1237, on which the court of appeals
detailed the “principles” on which it was relying, including the presumption against preemption.
38. It is true that the court of appeals referred again to the presumption against preemption
within the pages cited by the Supreme Court, see Geier, 166 F.3d at 1241, so that one could argue
that the Supreme Court was not ignoring the presumption altogether. The court of appeals, however,
only relied on the presumption when it addressed the express preemption issue, see id.; it did not rely
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The Supreme Court then recognized that although a number of state
supreme courts have found no preemption of these state tort claims, all of
the federal appeals courts have found preemption, mostly “under
ordinary pre-emption principles by virtue of the conflict such suits pose”
to federal law.39 After concluding that it agreed with these federal courts,
the Court identified the three questions involved in reaching that
conclusion:
First, does the Act’s express pre-emption provision pre-empt this
lawsuit? We think not. Second, do ordinary pre-emption principles
nonetheless apply? We hold that they do. Third, does this lawsuit
actually conflict with [the federal safety standard], hence with the Act
itself? We hold that it does.40

With that beginning, the Court proceeded to detail its analysis.
A. The Express Preemption Discussion
Although the Court decided, as most other courts also have, that the
Safety Act in expressly displacing all nonidentical state “standards” did
not expressly preempt state tort claims,41 this section will make several
observations to support the thesis that the Court will nonetheless preempt
what it wants to preempt and will not necessarily rely on congressional
intent as the ultimate touchstone. The express preemption discussion
reveals the Court’s failure not only to settle a basic interpretive question
in the language of the statute but more importantly to employ any
discernible traditional preemption principles in its resolution of the issue.
This trend, carried through the entire opinion, will ultimately let the
Court preempt whatever it wants to preempt. Further, while the Court
on the presumption when it addressed implied preemption by obstruction of purposes, see id. at
1242-43, when the presumption is most needed because of the ease with which courts can use that
kind of implied preemption to displace state law. For arguments to that effect, see Raeker-Jordan,
supra note 5, at 1382-1428. The court of appeals’s opinion itself demonstrates this last point: it
found implied preemption by obstruction of purposes even though it had previously stated that
the presumption against pre-emption counsels against finding express pre-emption when
the purpose is not clear from the statute’s language. In light of the apparent tension
between [two sections of the Act], it would be difficult to discern from the Act a “clear
and manifest purpose of Congress” to pre-empt a design defect claim based on the
absence of an airbag.
Geier, 166 F.3d at 1241 (emphasis added). Although the court of appeals had identified the
presumption against preemption absent the clear and manifest intent of Congress as the starting
point, and despite that it found no clear and manifest intent on the part of Congress to preempt state
tort airbag suits, the court of appeals implied preemption by finding some purpose of Congress that a
tort suit would frustrate. It was able to do this by separating congressional intent to displace state law
from the conflict determination, an approach later clearly sanctioned by the Supreme Court majority.
39. Geier, 529 U.S. at 866 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 867 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 868.
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attempts to support its conclusion that there is no express preemption
with a determination that Congress meant state tort law to play some role
in relation to the federal standards, the Court’s analysis of the interplay
between the two laws underscores the Court’s strained approach to
preemption in this case and its confusing view of Congress’s intentions,
which intentions in the end seem to have no hold on the Court.
First, the Court did not resolve the basic question of whether the
preempted “standards” should encompass state tort claims. Rather, the
Court found in the Act’s savings clause42 an indication that common law
actions should not be included in the statute’s preemptive reach.43 In the
Court’s view, the expressly preempted state safety “standards” arguably
could include those “standards imposed in common-law tort actions, as
well as standards contained in state legislation or regulations,” under a
“broad reading” of the term “standards.”44 But if the preemption
provision were read so broadly, the Court reasoned, then “little, if any,
potential ‘liability at common law’ would remain” to be saved by the
savings clause.45 The court concluded that because of the savings clause
and because “[t]he language of the pre-emption provision permits a
narrow reading that excludes common-law actions,” it would read that
provision narrowly.46
In a vacuum, this reading by the Court makes sense. But the Court
does not come to preemption questions in a vacuum, without
“preemption principles” to guide its judgment. Among other criticisms,47
one would argue that the savings clause should not have been the only
justification for reading the preemption provision more narrowly than the
“broad reading,” which would encompass state tort claims. Put another
way, the savings clause should not alone “permit[] a narrow reading”48 of
the preemption provision. The presumption against preemption, “in areas
where States have exercised their historic police powers (such as the

42. The clause applying at the time provided that “compliance with any Federal motor
vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability
under common law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k).
43. Geier, 529 U.S. at 868.
44. Id. In previous cases, the Court has discussed whether tort actions effectively force a
defendant to comply with a tort duty and thereby have an inherently regulatory effect. See, e.g.,
English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238
(1984); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
45. Geier, 529 U.S. at 868.
46. Id.
47. One could rightly criticize, for example, the Court’s failure to analyze the meaning of
“standards” and whether it includes common-law damages actions, as well as its failure “to clarify
the manner by which such provisions are to be interpreted, whether narrowly . . . or by reference to
legislative and administrative history.” Davis, supra note 2, at 1007.
48. Geier, 529 U.S. at 868.
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health and safety of their citizens),”49 should have strongly counseled
against a broad reading of the “state standards” language in the
preemption provision or even prescribed a narrow reading.50 But because
the Court never set out the “ordinary preemption principles” it was
following, it did not have to explain why it ignored the presumption and
why the presumption did not inform the Court’s interpretation of the
provision.
The Court attempted to bolster its conclusion that state tort law is not
expressly preempted with a brief discussion of the role that state tort law
could play vis-à-vis the federal regulations promulgated pursuant to the
Safety Act. But the Court curiously stumbles by apparently failing to
recognize the true nature of the federal standards promulgated pursuant
to the Safety Act; that is, all of these federal standards are by definition
minimum standards.51 An example of this stumbling is seen in the
following statement: “a reading of the express pre-emption provision that
excludes common-law tort actions gives actual meaning to the saving
clause’s literal language, while leaving adequate room for state tort law
to operate – for example, where federal law creates only a floor, i.e., a
minimum safety standard.”52 Shortly thereafter, positing the alternate
scenario in which the preemption provision is read broadly to preempt
even state tort actions, the Court stated:
if [that were the case, the preemption provision] would pre-empt all
non-identical state standards established in tort actions covering the
same aspect of performance as an applicable federal standard, even if
the federal standard merely established a minimum standard. On that
broad reading of the pre-emption clause little, if any, potential ‘liability
at common law’ would remain. And few, if any, state tort actions
would remain for the saving clause to save.53

In this discussion, the Court plainly suggests that some safety
standards promulgated under this Act would not be minimum standards,
but that suggestion is flatly at odds with the way Congress defined these

49. Geier v. Honda Motor Co., 166 F.3d 1236, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
50. As I have noted in a previous article, the Court has not confined its application of the
presumption to implied preemption but has prefaced its entire approach to preemption, including
express preemption, with that language. See Raeker-Jordan, supra note 5, at 1414 & nn. 212-13. The
D.C. Circuit in the Geier case did the same when reciting the preemption principles that it ascribed
to the Supreme Court. See Geier, 166 F.3d at 1237. The D.C. Circuit, however, only used the
presumption in its express preemption analysis. See id. at 1241, 1242-43.
51. Recall that the Act provided that the safety standards promulgated thereunder would be
“minimum standards for motor vehicle performance, or motor vehicle equipment performance.” 15
U.S.C. § 1391(2) (emphasis added).
52. Geier, 529 U.S. at 868 (emphasis added).
53. Id. (emphasis added).
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standards.54 This misreading is representative of a blind spot the Court
appears to have in the case. Because it does not recognize (or simply
refuses to recognize) that the standards Congress authorized are only
minimum standards, it cannot credit (or refuses to credit) an argument
that Congress intended state common law tort actions and federal
minimum safety standards, together, to comprise its scheme for
achieving more highway safety. The Court’s imprecise analysis of the
entire preemption question, begun because of its failure to employ the
longstanding “principles” that govern these questions, shows itself in
microcosm on the express preemption question.
Finally, the Court stated that “[w]e have found no convincing
indication that Congress wanted to pre-empt, not only state statutes and
regulations, but also common-law tort actions, in such circumstances.”55
By this last statement, the Court must have meant “in situations in which
the federal standard would be a minimum standard.” If that is what it
meant, the express preemption provision would logically operate to
preempt state tort actions in cases involving a federal standard that would
not be a minimum standard but would be a maximum or exclusive
standard. Because the Court nowhere recognizes or acknowledges that
the airbag standard at issue is a minimum standard,56 under the Court’s
reasoning, Geier should be a case involving a maximum or exclusive
standard. In that event, and again under the Court’s reasoning, the
express preemption provision should operate expressly to preempt state
tort airbag suits; the savings provision would not save those tort suits
because a maximum or exclusive federal standard is involved. But the
Court does not take its own analysis to the logical conclusion to find
express preemption.
It appears, rather, that the Court treats 57 the airbag standard as a

54. The dissenters agreed that “the Court completely ignores the important fact that by
definition all of the standards established under the Safety Act . . . impose minimum, rather than
fixed or maximum, requirements.” Id. at 903; see also Davis, supra note 2, at 1007-08 & n.274.
55. Geier, 529 U.S. at 868 (emphasis added).
56. The majority does not address it here and appears to skirt the issue later in the case, not
saying whether the airbag standard is a minimum or maximum standard. See id. at 874-86. Rather,
the Court acknowledges that during the phase-in period, the standard did not require manufacturers
to install one safety device and no other, but rather gave manufacturers options. See id. at 875-76.
Had the standard required a certain device and no other, it arguably thereby would have set an
exclusive or maximum requirement. The Court instead acknowledges that the standard “did not
guarantee the mix [of options] by setting a ceiling for each different passive restraint device.” Id. at
879.
57. Again, I say “treats “ because that is the only conclusion one can draw from the Court’s
finding, under the analysis it outlines, that the state tort suit is not expressly preempted. Elsewhere
the Court is elliptical on the question. See, e.g., id. at 874 (“In petitioners’ and the dissent’s view,
[the airbag standard] sets a minimum airbag standard. As far as [the standard] is concerned, the more
airbags, and the sooner, the better. But that was not the Secretary’s view.”).
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minimum standard that the express preemption provision would not
affect, and it therefore finds there is no express preemption of a state tort
suit concerning airbag absence. One is then left with the Court’s
seemingly categorical statement about Congress’s intent, which after all
is the “ultimate touchstone”58 in preemption analysis: that a majority of
the Justices of the Court “have found no convincing indication [in the
express language of the Act] that Congress wanted to pre-empt, not only
state statutes and regulations, but also common-law tort actions, in such
circumstances [; in other words, when the federal standard is only a
minimum standard].”59
But if that is so, the Court’s conclusion is puzzling in light of its later
finding, discussed immediately below, that state tort suits were impliedly
preempted under conflict preemption principles because of the
obstruction of federal purposes.60 It seems beyond logical that if
Congress’s purpose was not to preempt state tort actions when a federal
minimum standard was in operation; if it instead meant explicitly to save
them from preemption; and if “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone in any preemption case,” then the continued viability of state
claims against auto manufacturers could not, by definition, obstruct the
purposes of Congress’s safety legislation, which intended dual state and
federal participation.61 The puzzle is solved once one realizes that the
Court is shearing congressional intent away from the implied conflict
preemption analysis and finding “actual” conflict irrespective of what
Congress intended; congressional intent no longer is the “touchstone” it
has always been. Substituted for congressional intent is the Court’s
judgment about what law should survive and what should not.62 As long
58. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
59. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 868 (2000).
60. Another commentator has viewed it this way: “If the Court had concluded that ‘standard’
does not include common law damages actions in [the Safety Act], it could not then easily have
concluded, in the face of its purported focus on congressional intent, that the statute’s purposes
would be frustrated by permitting such actions.” Davis, supra note 2, at 1009.
61. The Court has reached such a seemingly incongruous result before. See Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977) (finding no intent to preempt according to express language, but
then finding implied/obstruction of purposes preemption). This approach has been criticized. See
Raeker-Jordan, supra note 5, at 1393-95.
62. To be sure, the Court has on occasion ignored congressional intent entirely, despite other
cases’ usual recitation of the taxonomy of preemption and recognition of the overriding vital role
played by congressional intent. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) is illustrative. In Perez, the
Court examined a state motor vehicle financial responsibility law for its collision with the federal
bankruptcy laws. Id. at 638, 643. In answering this question, the Court made no pretense of
attempting to discern congressional intent: it did not examine any federal statutory provisions for
some indication of intent to preempt, nor did the Court examine legislative history to ascertain
Congress’s preemptive intent. The Court simply decided that the state law frustrated one of the
objectives of the federal legislation, which objective the Court had identified on its own. See id. at
648 (stating that “[t]his Court on numerous occasions has stated . . . one of the primary purposes of
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as the Court can find some federal purpose that it thinks state tort law
obstructs, congressional intent is irrelevant.63 An analysis of the Court’s
express preemption approach reveals its later conflict preemption
approach to be inconsistent and lacking in logic. But there is much about
the rest of the Court’s opinion that is inconsistent and without logic.
B. The Implied Preemption Discussion
1. In general
The Court preempted state tort actions, employing what it said was
implied “obstacle” preemption,64 which displaces state law that conflicts
with the purposes and objectives of Congress. It is clear from the Court’s
approach to the question, however, that it is not applying the ordinary
preemption principles it refers to, including the presumption against
preemption. In addition, through a series of contortions, it effects a
preemption result that ignores and even subverts congressional
preemptive intent. The result is that the Court appears to be presuming
preemption, in the face of congressional intent to the contrary, rather
than casting a skeptical eye on the displacement of historic state health
and safety law.
The Court began its implied preemption discussion with a statement
that itself illustrates the Court’s snubbing of the “ordinary pre-emption
principles” on which it purports to rely: “We have just said that the
saving[s] clause at least removes tort actions from the scope of the
express pre-emption clause.”65 This statement is problematic first
because the presumption against preemption should mean that tort
the bankruptcy act.”)(internal citations omitted). The Court never mentioned the presumption against
preemption, even though the state law arguably touched on an area of traditional state regulation.
Perhaps the failure to employ the presumption could be explained by the federal constitutional power
over bankruptcies under U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and a need for uniformity, but the Court never
said so. Without much analysis apart from its own decree that the two laws could not stand together,
the Court overruled two earlier cases that had found no conflict on essentially the same facts. Id. at
651-52 (overruling Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962) and Reitz v. Mealey,
314 U.S. 33 (1941)). But Perez’s failure to follow the doctrine does not support the Court’s approach
in Geier; instead, it highlights the dangers inherent in implied obstacle conflict preemption.
63. Congressional intent was entirely absent in another seemingly aberrational case in which
the Court preempted state tort law with federal common law, the “government contractor defense,”
implicating what the Court called “uniquely federal interests.” See Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487
U.S. 500, 504-07, 512 (1988). Because there was no congressional intent to contend with,
presumably there was no need for the presumption, which applies regarding Congress’s preemptive
intentions. See Dinh, supra note 7, at 2109. Then, once the Court decided the federal common law
involved uniquely federal interests, and the presumption presented no obstacle, it was a short road to
a finding of obstacle preemption, even of a traditional state law area.
64. Geier, 529 U.S. at 881.
65. Id. at 869.
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actions should not have to be “removed” from the scope of the
ambiguous express preemption clause; the presumption says unless
Congress has been clear, one presumes this kind of state law is not
preempted. By relying on the savings clause to remove tort actions from
express preemption’s purview, the Court has again approached the
question from a position in essence presuming preemption. The Court
continued:
Does [the savings clause] do more? In particular, does it foreclose or
limit the operation of ordinary pre-emption principles insofar as those
principles instruct us to read statutes as pre-empting state laws
(including common-law rules) that ‘actually conflict’ with the statute or
federal standards promulgated thereunder?66

At the outset, the Court has put its thumb on the scale. By beginning with
the assertion that “ordinary pre-emption principles” “instruct” the Court
to pre-empt when there exists conflict, the Court emphasizes preemption
by some conflict that exists wholly apart from the preemption analysis.
But that approach puts the doctrinal cart before the horse in the following
way: the majority essentially begins with the presumption that there is
conflict and then asks whether a savings clause would alter a finding of
preemption dictated because of that conflict. The presumption would
have caused the Court to phrase the question differently, to ask in the
first instance whether there is conflict posed by state tort suits, as
determined by the scheme as Congress created it.
If the statutory text reveals that Congress’s intent was to achieve its
objectives through the dual application of federal and state law, not only
is preemptive intent lacking, but so is any indication that the application
of state law would pose a conflict with federal law’s purposes or
objectives; the survival of state law was part of Congress’s objectives. In
66. Id. (emphasis added). The Court also repeated its dictum from Freightliner Corp. v.
Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995) to the effect that the existence of an express preemption provision
“does not foreclose . . . ‘any possibility of implied conflict pre-emption.’” 529 U.S. at 869 (quoting
Myrick, 514 U.S. at 288). The Myrick Court had seemed to reverse the approach taken in Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992), which was to limit the preemption analysis to an express
preemption provision when that provision provided a “‘reliable indicium of congressional intent with
respect to state authority.’” Id. at 517 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505
(1978)). Myrick’s dicta, reworking the rule from Cipollone, becomes the rule adopted by the Geier
Court. (“Petitioner’s concede, as they must in light of [Myrick], that the pre-emption provision, by
itself, does not foreclose (through negative implication) ‘any possibility of implied conflict preemption.’” 529 U.S. at 869 (quoting Myrick, 514 U.S. at 288)). For Geier, that means that the bare
presence in the Safety Act of a provision that explicitly preempts some state standards does not
determine the inquiry; a court could still find implied conflict preemption even if Congress expressly
preempted only a limited area of state law. Whether or not Myrick was sound in its reasoning, that
holding does not address or require the rejection of the argument made herein that the express
provision together with a savings clause and other provisions could indeed demonstrate Congress’s
intent to preempt nothing more than is contained within the express provision, as well as inform the
conflict assessment.
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this way, “obstacle” or obstruction-of-purposes preemption cannot be
viewed in isolation from congressional preemptive intent.67 Because the
presumption works to focus the analysis on whether there is clear and
manifest evidence that Congress intended to preempt state tort suits, the
Court should first discern whether tort suits in fact conflict, or whether
the scheme as Congress set it up desires the dual regulation,
contemplates the coexistence of state and federal law, or at least exhibits
tolerance for some tension between state and federal law. But the Court’s
apparent inclinations away from state law influence its posture toward
preemption of that law, as seen here in the way the Court phrased its
question; the Court must already have concluded that state tort suits pose
some conflict to some purposes the Safety Act seeks to achieve. By
separating that conflict assessment from Congress’s intent, the Court is
free to do as it will with state law. That very inclination against state tort
actions, and the ease with which a court could override such tort actions,
however, are what the presumption against preemption was meant to
protect against.
In addition, by taking an approach that is at least not protective of
state safety law and is at most hostile to it, the Court essentially read the
savings clause out of the statute.68 If the Court can say that “ordinary
preemption principles” dictate that the Court must preempt when there is
conflict between state and federal law regardless of the existence of a
savings clause that, despite the Court’s best effort to make it ambiguous,
could not be clearer, then the savings clause clearly does not play a role
in the “conflict” or “frustration of purposes” determination and then may
just as well not even be in the statute. But because of the presumption
against preemption, a clause saving state tort law should play a central
role in the assessment of whether state law conflicts with the purposes of
federal law.

67. A corollary to this argument is that judicial preemption is accomplished in this very way:
judges roam around a federal statute and federal regulations to find some purpose that might be
obstructed by state law, even if examination of the statute, say of an express preemption clause,
demonstrates no congressional intent to displace state law. It happened in Geier and has happened
before. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. By separating congressional intent regarding
preemption from judicially-attributed congressional purposes that are often not stated, and finding
preemption by “obstruction” or conflict that way, judges are able to circumvent Congress and
preempt state law absent a clear and manifest congressional intent to do so and even in the presence
of congressional intent not to preempt state law. For similar observations, see Davis, supra note 2 ,
at 971 (stating that “the Court has found preemption of state law tort actions when Congress has, in
no uncertain terms, expressly stated the contrary”); Supreme Court: Leading Cases, supra note 3, at
356 (seeing a preference in favor of preemption that “often leads the Court to impose an exclusively
federal standard despite even seemingly contrary statutory provisions”).
68. Justice Stevens in dissent agreed with this conclusion if not with this reasoning. See
Geier, 529 U.S. at 898 (asserting that “[t]he Court’s approach to the case has the practical effect of
reading the saving clause out of the statute altogether”)(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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But the Court did not approach the preemption question as ordinary
preemption principles would dictate. The Court began explaining its
conclusion, that the savings clause “(like the express pre-emption
provision) does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption
principles,”69 with the statement that “[n]othing in the language of the
saving clause suggests an intent to save state-law tort actions that conflict
with federal regulations.”70 One can make two observations about this
statement. First, as indicated in part above, the Court’s approach more
clearly separates the savings clause from the “conflict” assessment,
rather than seeing in the savings clause some evidence of Congress’s
view of conflict. Had the Court employed the presumption in its conflict
analysis, it likely would have attributed more significance to the savings
clause since the clause at least appears to take the presumption against
preempting state law to an irrebuttable level and then should have some
bearing on the “conflict with purposes” question.
The second point is that the savings clause could not be clearer when
it says “compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard
issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any
liability under common law.”71 No one is exempted from “any”
common-law liability, which obviously includes even that liability that
may at first appear to conflict with federal law. Even the Court itself
recently said the word “any” in a statute had a clear and expansive
meaning. In Department of Housing and Urban Development v.
Rucker,72 the Court considered a statute providing “that each ‘public
housing authority shall utilize leases which . . . provide that . . . any
drug-related criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a
public housing tenant, any member of the tenant’s household, or any
guest or other person under the tenant’s control, shall be cause for
termination of tenancy.’”73 The Court held that the “plain language of the
statute”74 “unambiguously requires lease terms that vest local public
housing authorities with the discretion to evict tenants for the
drug-related activity of household members and guests whether or not
the tenant knew, or should have known, about the activity.”75 The Court
explained:
Congress’ decision not to impose any qualification in the statute,

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 869.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1397(k).
122 S. Ct. 1230 (2002).
Id. at 1232 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (1994 ed., Supp. V))(emphasis added).
Id. at 1233.
Id.
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combined with its use of the term “any” to modify “drug-related
criminal activity,” precludes any knowledge requirement. As we have
explained, “the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or
some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’” Thus, any drug-related
activity engaged in by the specified persons is grounds for termination,
not just drug-related activity that the tenant knew, or should have
known, about.76

Applying such a definition to the use of the word “any” in the Safety
Act, the Court should have concluded that no one is exempted from “one
[type of liability] or some [type of liability] indiscriminately of whatever
kind.” This application of course would mean that even liability that the
Court might think conflicts with federal law is not preempted but
survives under the Safety Act.
The fact that one must discuss the interpretation of “any” due to the
Court’s twisting of clear and unambiguous language is troubling. But
even more troubling is the Court’s apparent determination to take some
cover from preemption doctrine from which the Court has stripped those
aspects that are the most problematic to its finding of implied
preemption. Even if one were to concede that “any” in the savings clause
is ambiguous, is not expansive in meaning, and might permit the
preemption of some tort claims, one should still have the previouslyreliable argument that the presumption against preemption urged an
expansive reading of the savings clause, together with a narrow reading
of the express preemption provision. But the Court has eschewed even
mention of the presumption, to say nothing of the heeding of it. So the
Court compounds the barriers to plaintiffs who argue that there is no
preemption under this Act: the Court refuses to acknowledge any
presumption against preemption and pays no heed to the plain meaning
of the savings clause.
It appears that, before it will validate or give effect to a savings
clause, the Court wants Congress to say that tort claims that appear to
conflict with federal law actually do not and are not preempted. The
Court seems to expect the possibility of such an express provision
because it assumes that there exist some tort claims that must conflict
with some purposes of federal law. But the presumption exists to prevent
a court from lightly implying conflict and requires that preemption only
be implied when Congress’s intent to preempt is clear. So the Court’s
apparent requirement that Congress say plainly that “no state tort suit
will conflict with federal purposes” turns preemption doctrine on its
head, putting the burden on Congress to overcome what seems to be a
76. Id. (citations omitted); see also John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav.
Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 96 (1993) (finding that the word “any” modifies “without qualification”).
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presumption of conflict. If Congress fails to do that, it is then a short road
to courts’ finding that some federal purpose is obstructed by the state
law.77
Perhaps most fundamentally, however, by saving all tort claims from
preemption, Congress is saying that it did not view tort claims, under its
scheme, as conflicting.78 Put simply, Congress probably thought, with
good reason, that its intent was clear enough. How can Congress be
clearer than to say that no one is exempt from any liability? There is no
good reason why Congress would even consider including a provision to
the effect that “compliance does not exempt any person from any
liability at common law, even if that liability conflicts with federal law.”
If Congress thought there was no conflict, they would never contemplate
including the provision the Court appears to want to see in the statute.
The Court’s approach creates a straw man that cannot be knocked down
because Congress would never do more than it already did in the Safety
Act, using clear and comprehensive language that should suffice to make
its intentions clear and manifest.79
In the next line of the opinion and further contorting the analysis, the
Court focuses on the words “compliance” and “does not exempt” in the
savings clause,80 arguing that those words “sound as if they simply bar a
special kind of defense, namely, a defense that compliance with a federal
standard automatically exempts a defendant from state law, whether the
federal government meant that standard to be an absolute requirement or
only a minimum one.”81 If the Court is talking about some state-law
defense that compliance with federal standards shields a defendant from
liability under state law, then the Court’s ear for what this clause “sounds
77. Indeed, that has been the conclusion reached by all but one of the federal courts
addressing this issue. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 866 (indicating that the lone federal court not finding
obstacle preemption nonetheless preempted state law under the express preemption provision of the
Safety Act). Not surprisingly, “[s]everal state courts have held to the contrary,” id., presumably
because they have more of an interest in applying the presumption, thereby protecting state law
against easy override and protecting the federal-state balance ensured by the federal scheme.
78. Justice Stevens viewed the issue in a similar fashion:
I believe the language of this particular saving clause unquestionably limits, and possibly
forecloses entirely, the pre-emptive effect that safety standards promulgated by the
Secretary [of Transportation] have on common-law remedies. Under that interpretation,
there is by definition no frustration of federal purposes – that is, no ‘toleration of actual
conflict’ – when tort suits are allowed to go forward.
529 U.S. at 900 n.16 (emphasis added)(citations omitted)(quoting Geier majority opinion, id. at
872).
79. See also Davis, supra note 2, at 1020 (stating that in the future, “[t]he Court will . . .
require a clarity of language . . . perhaps not known to humankind”).
80. Recall that the savings clause in effect at the time provided, “compliance with any
Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from
any liability under common law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k).
81. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000).

RAEKER-JORDAN 8 - MACRO

1]

2/5/2003 9:46 AM

GEIER V. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.

21

like” is not very reliable, first because the “defense” that it posits is not
the general rule. The “traditional view,”82 as indicated in the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability, is that “compliance with an
applicable product safety statute or administrative regulation . . . does not
preclude as a matter of law a finding of product defect”83 and therefore a
finding of liability under state law. In fact, the Restatement elaborates
further that its approach
reflects the traditional view that the standards set by most product
safety statutes or regulations generally are only minimum standards.
Thus, most product safety statutes or regulations establish a floor of
safety below which product sellers fall only at their peril, but they leave
open the question of whether a higher standard of product safety should
be applied. This is the general rule, applicable in most cases.84

The bottom line is that in most jurisdictions, defendants simply would
not have the defense that the Court identifies as being singled out by
Congress. In fact, such a defense in a state tort case is “rare.”85 It seems
highly unlikely that Congress would have devoted a savings clause to the
nullification of a defense that is rare. The Court’s impression, therefore,
that the savings clause “sounds like” Congress was anticipating such a
defense rings hollow.
In addition, as the Restatement notes,
When a court concludes that a defendant is not liable by reason of
having complied with a safety . . . statute or regulation, it is deciding
that the product in question is not defective as a matter of the law of
that state. The safety statute or regulation may be a federal provision,
but the decision to give it determinative effect is a state-law
determination. . . . [By contrast, in the preemption context,] [j]udicial
deference to federal product safety statutes or regulations occurs not
because the court concludes that compliance with the statute or

82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4 cmt. e (1998).
83. Id. § 4(b) (emphasis added).
84. Id. cmt. e.; see also Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J.
2049, 2050-51 (2000). The same is true in a simple negligence case. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 224 (2000)(stating that “[t]he fact that the defendant has complied with a statute is not
ordinarily in itself a defense. The trier of fact may find that, although the defendant complied with
the statutory directives, he should have done even more to attain reasonable levels of safety”). The
bases Professor Dobbs cites for this general rule include that “[most statutes] aim at minimum
standards but are not meant to establish the outer limits of the defendant’s safety responsibilities”
and that “many statutes are written in response to lobbying efforts of the industry they purport to
regulate, and they are not likely to represent a balanced attempt by neutral parties to achieve
appropriate safety.” Id.
85. Professor Dobbs has said that it is only in “exceptional” and “rare” cases that courts find
“compliance with statutory standards is a complete defense.” DOBBS, supra note 84, § 224. But
Professor Rabin has recently examined whether the regulatory compliance defense is being
reconsidered. See Rabin, supra note 84.
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regulation shows the product to be nondefective [under state tort law];
the issue of defectiveness under state law is never reached. Rather, the
court defers because, when a federal statute or regulation is preemptive,
the Constitution mandates federal supremacy.86

Presumably, Congress would be aware of its constitutional role under the
Supremacy Clause and would understand that the contents of its
legislation, including savings clauses, delimit the statute’s preemptive
reach. And because congressional enactments usually do not determine
state-law questions, such as the appropriate role of federal standards in
state product liability suits, the savings clause language is more likely to
be language of preemption than of anything else.87 The Court’s reading
of the savings provision as merely one that would simply affect a state
tort defense demonstrates again its determination first to disbelieve
Congress meant what it said in a clear savings clause, and then to
substitute the Court’s desired objectives of the legislation for those that
Congress sought.
Next, the Court found it “difficult to understand why Congress
would have insisted on a compliance-with-federal-regulation
precondition to the [savings] provision’s applicability had it wished the
Act to ‘save’ all state-law tort actions, regardless of their potential threat
to the objectives of federal safety standards promulgated under that
Act.”88 Purely as a matter of semantics, the Court’s statement is difficult
to fathom; Congress’s statement is simply not written as containing a
precondition. A more straightforward way to place a precondition on
applicability would be to provide that “if one complies with federal
regulations, then he is not exempt from any liability at common law.”
The restatement of the clause as a true precondition reveals the absurdity
in the Court’s interpretation of the original statement as a precondition; a
precondition would require compliance with federal regulation before a
defendant would be subjected to state tort liability. The logical analytical
corollary would then suggest that noncompliance with the federal
regulations would exempt one from state tort liability, since
noncompliance does not fall within the saving “precondition” set by
Congress. But surely even the Court would find such a statement absurd,

86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4 cmt. e (1998). (emphases
added).
87. Congress could say that compliance with federal standards proves non-negligence or
product non-defectiveness, which would mean that the Supremacy Clause then applies and has the
same effect as preempting state tort actions. Congress does not usually do that, however. See DOBBS,
supra note 84, § 224 (calling it an “[e]xceptional case[]” for legislators to “expressly provide that the
compliance with a particular statute is a complete defense”).
88. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000).
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as that result would contradict settled tort principles.89 There are also at
least three substantive reasons why the Court has difficulty
understanding what Congress has done, all of which stem from the
Court’s failure to heed the presumption against preemption. The
overarching reason seems to be that the Court has its own idea about the
proper roles of federal and state law in achieving highway safety such
that it has difficulty seeing that Congress could seek to achieve safety in
a different way and so have different “purposes” for writing a statute the
way it did. The Court’s failure to heed the presumption against
preemption permits its own predilections about purposes of legislation to
pose the biggest threat to federalism and state tort law in the “obstacle”
preemption context.90
That failure and the Court’s resultant posture lead directly to the
second reason the Court cannot understand why Congress would have
saved all state tort claims “regardless of their potential threat to the
objectives of federal safety standards promulgated under that Act.”
Because it is not starting from a presumption against preemption, the
Court cannot accept that Congress simply saw no conflict in setting
minimum standards and in recognizing and even assuming that state tort
law still does operate under those circumstances. The very inability of
the Court to accept that possibility again demonstrates the need for the
presumption in the implied “obstacle” preemption context. Had the Court
begun from a presumption against lightly inferring Congress’s
preemptive intent to displace state tort law, it could have been more open
to seeing that Congress could have intended the very thing the Court
could “not understand”: that state tort law and federal minimum
standards, far from conflicting, in fact can and often do work together to
achieve Congress’s desired ends. Instead, the Court distorts clear
statutory language with tortuous interpretations to reach what appears to
be its desired end, the preemption of state tort law,91 which it could not
do under this statutory language were it to apply the presumption against

89. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4(a) & cmt. d
reporters’ note (the latter note recognizing that “[t]he overwhelming majority of courts hold that
violations of product safety regulations cause products to be defective as a matter of law in cases
involving both design and failure to warn,” and that “the rule . . . that noncompliance with an
appropriate governmental product safety regulation renders a product defective . . . finds its origin in
a common-law rule holding that the unexcused omission of a statutory safety requirement is
negligence per se”).
90. One commentator similarly explained: “One important explanation for this shift in
preemption doctrine must be that the Court’s distrust of products liability actions is greater than its
interest in determining congressional intent or preserving traditional state authority.” Davis, supra
note 2, at 1009.
91. See id. at 1021 (observing that the Court presumes preemption and then seeks support to
justify preemption).
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preemption.
By labeling the clause a “precondition,” the Court reveals a third
reason for its inability to understand why Congress would include the
clause if it meant to save all tort claims. As a “precondition,” the clause
would seemingly exclude some state law claims and include or save from
preemption only those that had met the condition. Had it applied the
presumption against preemption, however, the Court should have read
the savings clause with an eye against preemption of state tort claims and
so would not read the clause as containing a “precondition,” which is by
nature exclusionary and under the Court’s reasoning would not save all
claims. The proper reasoning would go like this: if one assumes that
Congress would not lightly preempt state tort law, but would have to do
so “clearly and manifestly,” then one would not read the savings clause
as containing a “precondition” to its applicability, but read it in a light at
least somewhat more favorable to the preservation of state law. Not read
as an exclusionary precondition, then, the “compliance” language simply
evidences a congressional recognition of what a first-year student of tort
law knows: that usually federal standards are only minimums that do not
automatically trump state tort liability principles. It was a way for
Congress to make clear the desire to preserve state law claims as
supplements to federal minimum standards, by simply reiterating the
general state law rule about compliance with federal minimum standards.
The Court’s labeling of the clause a “precondition” skews the preemption
analysis from the outset.
The Court next contended that its interpretation of the savings clause
does not conflict with the clause’s purpose, “say by rendering it
ineffectual.”92 The Court recognized some role remaining for the savings
clause: “it . . . preserves those actions that seek to establish greater safety
than the minimum safety achieved by a federal regulation intended to
provide a floor.”93 But as has already been noted, Congress prescribed
that all the standards promulgated pursuant to this Act were to be
minimum standards. Under the Court’s statement here, then, and
according to what Congress intended, all state tort actions should be
saved. Any other interpretation necessarily renders the clause
“ineffectual.” As the preceding dissection of the Court’s reasoning
demonstrates, the Court struggled mightily to imply preemption in this
context, contrary to congressional intent and traditional preemption
analysis.

92. Geier, 529 U.S. at 870.
93. Id.
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2. The majority’s treatment of broad savings clauses
The approach the majority took to the savings clause, saving any
common-law claim against anyone governed by the Safety Act, further
demonstrates its failure to apply or heed a presumption against
preemption and any requirement that Congress’s intent to preempt be
clear and manifest. In the end, in fact, the Court’s approach effectively
reads a clear savings clause out of the federal statute, thereby frustrating
Congress’s clear and manifest intent not to preempt state tort actions and
accomplishing judicial preemption instead.
On the way to nullifying the savings clause, and to further support its
narrow and tortured construction of the clear savings clause, the Court
reminded readers that “this Court has repeatedly ‘declined to give broad
effect to saving clauses where doing so would upset the careful
regulatory scheme established by federal law.’”94 For this proposition,
the Court rather disingenuously relied on United State v. Locke,95 which
ultimately did decline to give full effect to a broad savings clause, but
which involved a much different statutory scheme and regulatory
environment than that involved in Geier. Locke involved Washington
State’s regulation of oil tanker design and operations in the face of a
“comprehensive federal regulatory scheme governing oil tankers.”96
More significantly, however, describing the backdrop against which
Congress legislated and against which the Court evaluated the
preemption case, the Court stated,
The State of Washington has enacted legislation in an area where the
federal interest has been manifest since the beginning of our Republic
and is now well established. The authority of Congress to regulate
interstate navigation, without embarrassment from intervention of the
separate States and resulting difficulties with foreign nations, was cited
in the Federalist Papers as one of the reasons for adopting the
Constitution.97

The Court discussed three federal statutes governing the issues98 and “a
significant and intricate complex of international treaties and maritime
agreements bearing upon the licensing and operation of vessels.”99
Because the regulated area in Locke was already one of peculiarly
national interest, the presumption against preemption did not and should

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 870 (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106 (2000)).
529 U.S. 89 (2000).
Id. at 94.
Id. at 99.
See id. at 100-102. The Court said that these were the “principal statutes.” Id. at 100.
Id. at 102.
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not have affected the interpretation, broad or narrow, of the savings
clause. The Court itself made this distinction in Locke:
The Rice [v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.] opinion stated: “The question in
each [preemption] case is what the purpose of Congress was. Congress
legislated here in a field which the States have traditionally occupied.
So we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superceded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” The qualification given by the
word “so” and by the preceding sentences in Rice are of considerable
consequence. As Rice indicates, an “assumption” of nonpre-emption is
not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there has been a
100
history of significant federal presence.

The Court in Locke was right that the presumption should not apply in
that instance because “Congress has legislated in the field from the
earliest days of the Republic, creating an extensive statutory and
regulatory scheme.”101 The Locke Court distinguished the situation in
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,102 stating parenthetically that Medtronic
involved “medical negligence, a subject historically regulated by the
States,”103 implying that the presumption recognized in Rice should apply
in the Medtronic situation. The same should be said of Geier, involving
tort claims and product safety. In short, the Geier Court erroneously
relied on Locke for a principle governing the interpretation of a savings
clause in a case involving an area of peculiarly state interest, in which
even the Locke Court recognized the presumption should apply. And if
the presumption against lightly inferring preemption should apply, then
the clause saving state law claims from preemption should be given
broad effect or at least not constricted to the point of rendering it entirely
ineffectual.
More generally, that the Court in Locke bothered to reference the
presumption against preemption and explain its inapplicability shows
starkly the failings of an apparently preemption-determined Court in
Geier. Rather than rely on the empty construct of “ordinary pre-emption
principles” as it did in Geier, the Locke Court followed prior articulations
of the law.104 In not overtly recognizing the presumption and not

100. Id. at 108 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)(also quoting Jones v. Rath Packing,
430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) for the proposition that the “‘assumption’ is triggered where ‘the field
which Congress is said to have pre-empted has been traditionally occupied by the States’”).
101. Id.
102. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
103. Locke, 529 U.S. at 108 (citing Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485).
104. One commentator has said that “Locke is more representative of modern preemption law
than Geier, at least in the sense that it implicitly acknowledges the general availability of a
presumption against preemption.” Tushnet, supra note 3, at 24.
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applying the rules it articulated in a case just two months before it
decided Geier,105 the Geier Court appears to show its determination to
preempt through employment of the nebulous “obstruction of purposes”
approach in a way that substantiates this Article’s criticism of that
approach.
To further support its narrow reading of the savings clause, the Court
also cited Texas and Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.106
and American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone,
Inc.107 But, like Locke, Abilene Cotton involved an area of peculiar
federal concern: the setting of reasonable rates for interstate rail shipment
under the Interstate Commerce Act.108 Under traditional preemption
rules, the presumption against preemption and the requirement of clarity
regarding Congress’s intent to preempt would not affect the reading of
the savings clause in that situation.109 The Geier Court’s reliance on
Abilene Cotton is therefore misplaced.
The case of American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Central
Office Telephone, Inc.,110 (“AT&T”) involved a savings clause identical
to that in Abilene Cotton and the issue was nearly identical. In fact, the
Court in AT&T took the same approach that it had in Abilene Cotton,
applying what it called the “filed-rate doctrine”: “[t]hese provisions [in
AT&T] are modeled after similar provisions of the Interstate Commerce
Act (ICA) and share its goal of preventing unreasonable and
discriminatory charges. Accordingly, the century-old ‘filed-rate doctrine’
associated with the ICA tariff provisions applies to the [act here
involved] as well.”111 In addressing the effect the savings clause should
105. The Court decided Locke on March 6, 2000, and Geier on May 22, 2000. See Locke, 529
U.S. at 89; Geier, 529 U.S. at 861.
106. 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
107. 524 U.S. 214 (1998).
108. See 204 U.S. at 430.
109. The Abilene Cotton Court did use language that seemed nearly to replicate the
presumption: “we concede that we must be guided by the principle that repeals by implication are
not favored, and indeed that a statute will not be construed as taking away a common law [sic] right
existing at the date of its enactment unless that result is imperatively required . . . .” Id. at 436-37.
But it followed those words with, “that is to say, unless it be found that the preexisting right is so
repugnant to the statute that the survival of such right would in effect deprive the subsequent statute
of its efficacy; in other words, render [the statute] nugatory.” Id. at 437. The Court was essentially
saying that a statute will not be seen to preempt the state law unless that law conflicts with federal
law. Clearly, the Court was not recognizing or, later in the opinion, applying a presumption or clarity
requirement when it decided that the broad savings clause should not be interpreted broadly. And as
previously mentioned, it need not have applied the presumption since although state common law
was involved, the state claims touched upon a peculiarly federal area of interest to which the
presumption would not apply. Abilene Oil is thus consistent with prior doctrine, whereas Geier is
not.
110. 524 U.S. 214 (1998).
111. Id. at 222 (citations omitted).

RAEKER-JORDAN 8 - MACRO

28

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

2/5/2003 9:46 AM

[Volume XVII

have on the preemption question, the Court in AT&T simply stated that
“we have long held that the [savings clause in the ICA] preserves only
those rights that are not inconsistent with the statutory filed-tariff
requirements.”112 Therefore, far from creating a general rule against
giving “broad effect to saving clauses where doing so would upset the
careful regulatory scheme established by federal law,”113 Abilene Cotton
and AT&T simply illustrate the application of an idiosyncratic rule
adopted for particular areas of law implicating peculiar federal interests
in interstate commerce and rate setting.
That the Geier Court represented, as it did with Locke, that these
cases set out a general rule that broad savings clauses should not be
construed as written in any case where the federal regulatory scheme
might be “upset” demonstrates that the Court has rejected the
presumption against preemption. To be consistent with precedent, the
Court should have restricted those prior holdings to their facts, or at least
not imported their rule into a case involving state tort safety law, an area
of traditional state concern. The application of this general rule in a case
like Geier means that there is no obligation on courts to presume that
Congress, in its use of a clear and broad savings clause, did not intend to
preempt state law unless its intent to that end was elsewhere clear and
manifest. It will now be much more likely that courts, unrestricted by the
presumption against preemption, will overreach in their attempt to find
“obstruction of purposes” conflict preemption and work a result that
Congress did not intend.114 The very likelihood of easy override of state
112. Id. at 227.
113. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 870 (2000) (quoting United States v.
Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106 (2000)).
114. In another case, Justice Kennedy recognized and was troubled by this danger as well.
Concurring in the judgment but not in the opinion in which the plurality implied preemption by
obstruction-of-purposes conflict, he wrote that
[t]he plurality’s broad view of actual conflict pre-emption is contrary to two basic
principles of our pre-emption jurisprudence[, one of which is the presumption against
preemption]. . . . A free-wheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state [law] is in tension
with federal objectives would undercut the principle that it is Congress rather than the
courts that pre-empts state law.
Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 111 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). In light of his approach in Gade, it is surprising that Justice Kennedy
joined the majority in Geier, see 529 U.S. at 863, which not only engaged in a “free-wheeling
judicial inquiry” but wholly ignored and even eradicated the presumption against preemption.
Justice Rehnquist in a much earlier case had also dissented when the Court overrode a
state law relating to the state’s traditional police power, believing that the clarity requirement’s
“stringent standard” required a different result. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 544-45
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Rath
Packing, as with Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Gade, is difficult to reconcile with his joining of the
majority in Geier.
In dissent in Geier, Justice Stevens made clear his view of the necessity for the
presumption: “the presumption reduces the risk that federal judges will draw too deeply on malleable
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law was the reason for the presumption and clarity requirement in the
first place.115 Nonetheless, despite the presence of a clear and
comprehensive savings clause and the presence of an ambiguous express
preemption provision, and in the context of an area of traditional state
law control, the Court concluded that “the saving clause foresees – it
does not foreclose – the possibility that a federal safety standard will preempt a state common-law tort action with which it conflicts”116 and
opened the door to unbridled judicial preemption against the intent of
Congress.
3. The majority’s reply to the dissent
The dissent charged the Court with overreaching to find preemption,
expanding preemption doctrine, and rejecting settled principles like the
presumption against preemption.117 The majority’s response to these
charges, however, does not counter them but serves to illustrate the
Court’s rejection of the presumption against preemption and the clarity
requirement appended to it. As the Court was arguing that what the
dissent urged on the Court added unnecessary and unworkable
complexity, the Court was busy stripping the doctrine of whatever
coherence it had before Geier, simplifying it beyond anything it had done
before, and thereby enabling the ascendancy of judicial preemption.
The Court opined that the express preemption provision and the
savings clause together evidenced a “neutral policy, not a specially
favorable or unfavorable policy, towards the application of ordinary
conflict pre-emption principles.”118 Based on that finding of equipoise,
and politically unaccountable sources . . . in finding pre-emption based on frustration of purposes.”
529 U.S. at 908 n.22.
115. Justice Stevens in dissent put it this way:
Our presumption against pre-emption is rooted in the concept of federalism. . . . The
signal virtues of this presumption [against preemption] are its placement of the power of
pre-emption squarely in the hands of Congress, which is far more suited than the
Judiciary to strike the appropriate state/federal balance (particularly in areas of traditional
state regulation), and its requirement that Congress speak clearly when exercising that
power. In this way, the structural safeguards inherent in the normal operation of the
legislative process operate to defend state interests from undue infringement. In addition,
the presumption serves as a limiting principle that prevents federal judges from running
amok with our potentially boundless (and perhaps inadequately considered) doctrine of
implied conflict pre-emption based on frustration of purposes[.]
Geier, 529 U.S. at 907 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(emphasis added)(citations omitted); see also RaekerJordan, supra note 5, at 1391 n.52.
116. Geier, 529 U.S. at 870.
117. See id. at 886 (“I respectfully dissent . . . especially from the Court’s unprecedented
extension of the doctrine of pre-emption.”), id. at 894 (“[I]t is equally clear that the Supremacy
Clause does not give unelected federal judges carte blanche to use federal law as a means of
imposing their own ideas of tort reform on the States.”), id. at 906-10.
118. Id. at 870-71.
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the Court concluded, “we can find nothing in any natural reading of the
two provisions that would favor one set of policies over the other where
a jury-imposed safety standard actually conflicts with a federal safety
standard.”119 The first point to note here is that, as already demonstrated,
the Court engaged in anything but a “natural reading” of the provisions,
particularly the savings clause. So it is not surprising that it missed any
favoritism toward state common-law actions expressed in the provisions.
That observation aside, there are two indications that the Court again
purposely ignored or at the very least misapplied the settled doctrine.
First, by admitting that “we can finding nothing” that would tip the
balance between the ambiguous preemption provision and the clear
savings clause, it is clearly ignoring the presumption that is “inherent in
ordinary preemption principles” that the Court mentions so often. The
presumption against preemption, requiring that courts not infer
preemption, including conflict preemption, without some clear and
manifest intent on the part of Congress to do that, would require the
preservation of state tort law in this instance in which the Court finds the
two clauses and their policies in equipoise.120
Second, it is again evident that the majority ignored the presumption
by assuming that actual conflict can be determined in a vacuum,
separately from the questions of the meanings of the preemption and
savings provisions. The presumption should guide the Court’s
determination of the preemption and savings provisions in the first
instance, and only then assist in reaching a conclusion on the conflict.
For the Court to say that it cannot find anything that tips the scales
“where a jury-imposed safety standard actually conflicts with a federal
safety standard” puts the interpretive cart before the horse and naturally
permits an easy override of state law, because conflict by obstruction of
some purposes is determined without reference to the very parts of the
statute that indicate congressional intent regarding the state law at issue.
The Court further argued that Congress would have wanted some
“ordinary preemption principle” to apply in cases of actual conflict with
federal purposes; “in [the absence of such principle], state law could
impose legal duties that would conflict directly with federal regulatory
mandates, say by premising liability upon the presence of the very
windshield retention requirements that federal law requires.”121 To be
119. Id. at 871.
120. The dissenters were of a similar view: “[t]he Court apparently views the question of preemption in this case as a close one. Under ‘ordinary experience-proved principles of conflict preemption,’ therefore, the presumption against pre-emption should control. Instead, the Court simply
ignores the presumption.” Id. at 906 (quoting Geier majority opinion, id. at 874) (citations omitted).
121. Id. at 871. If these were regulatory mandates or maximum standards, the result could well
be different because then state tort law, to the extent that it might force manufacturers to adopt a
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sure, there is likely a “presumption that Congress did not intend to allow
state obstructions of federal policy,” and the existence of that
presumption is a “central inquiry in conflict preemption analysis.”122 But
when the issue involves a federal statutory scheme, what Congress
viewed as an obstacle must of necessity determine the analysis. But here
again the Court misapprehends or refuses to credit what Congress has
done or intended in the Safety Act. The standards established under the
Act are minimum standards, to be supplemented by common-law actions
that may determine that even more safety is required to make the
automobile safe. That Congress set up the system in this way is not
puzzling but is a quite common scenario.123 Yet this Court, which
tortured the language of a clear savings clause, sees a complex
arrangement that Congress could not have intended, despite its clear
language: “[w]e do not claim that Congress lacks the constitutional
power to write a statute that mandates such a complex type of
state/federal relationship. But there is no reason to believe Congress has
done so here.”124
In fact, the relationship that Congress set up is complex to the Court
only because it fails to apply the “ordinary preemption principles” it
repeatedly refers to without detail. Because it starts from the assumption
that there can be conflict, irrespective of congressional intent and
statutory language, the Court makes the statutory scheme much more
complex than it is. It determined there was possible conflict first, and
then asked the question whether Congress meant to allow actual conflict
to exist with the federal rules. The apparent complexity flows only from
the Court’s analysis, not from Congress’s scheme. And the Court sees
“no reason to believe” Congress would set up a system wherein state tort
law supplements minimum federal standards because it ignores the
presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt this sort of state
law. The presumption supplies the very reason to believe that Congress
saw no conflict between federal minimum standards and state tort law,
absent something much clearer in the legislation to negate that
presumption. The presumption also then renders the statutory scheme
much less complex and much easier to understand.
different standard, could create a situation of impossibility of compliance; it would arguably be
impossible to comply both with the federal mandatory standard and with the different state tort
standard. Were that problem to be viewed as one of impossibility, I have argued elsewhere that the
presumption against preemption would not apply to protect the state law; the Supremacy Clause
would preempt it automatically. See Raeker-Jordan, supra note 5, at 1439-43. For another view of
the impossibility of compliance issue when state tort law is at issue, see id. at 1443-45.
122. TRIBE, supra note 19, § 6-28, at 1177.
123. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
124. 529 U.S. at 872 (citations omitted).
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Finally, in dismissing an argument by the dissent that the federal act
in this case imposed a “special burden” on those alleging implicit
conflict preemption to demonstrate that Congress preempted commonlaw claims,125 the Court more clearly rejected any possibility that the
long-standing presumption against preemption had a place among those
“ordinary preemption principles” to which it constantly referred; the
Court stated that there was no basis for interpreting the express
preemption and savings provisions as imposing any special burden.126
Even if Justice Stevens would impose some special burden beyond the
presumption against preemption,127 the Court treated the burden more
generally, and so treated it more like the presumption against
preemption, which challengers to state law would have to overcome as
with a “special burden.” Because the Court was rejecting something that
it was treating as a sort of presumption against preemption, it arguably
expressly rejected the actual presumption as well, which it had not done
before in the opinion.
In further dismissing Justice Stevens’s special burden, the Court
claimed that Stevens was “further complicating well-established preemption principles that already are difficult to apply.”128 Instead, it said,
“ordinary pre-emption principles, grounded in longstanding precedent,
apply. We would not further complicate the law with complex new
doctrine.”129 This last statement is both misleading and a tremendous
understatement by the Court. It is misleading first because the Court
leads the reader to believe that there has never existed some particular
hurdle, such as a presumption, that had to be vaulted by one claiming
implied preemption of state law in an area of traditional state regulation.
It is an understatement because, as demonstrated, the Court kept the law
so simple throughout the opinion that it never clarified just what
comprised those “ordinary preemption principles” to which it repeatedly
referred. The Court stripped the doctrine of much of its content,
replacing it with the five-member majority’s views of obstacles and
objectives unencumbered by the plain meaning of the language used by
Congress. The added benefit to the majority in their approach became
clear in the form of more simplicity. In not detailing the contours of
125. See id. at 898 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. Geier, 529 U.S. at 873.
127. And it appears that he would, since he elsewhere discussed the presumption and did not
link the special burden with it. See, e.g., id. at 906-07. Further, the full text of Justice Stevens’s
“special burden” idea suggests that he would apply the special burden to cases in which a party is
relying for preemption on a “temporary regulatory policy – rather than a conflict with congressional
policy or with the text of any regulation.” Id. at 898-99.
128. Id. at 873.
129. Id. at 874 (emphasis added).
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preemption doctrine, the majority could ignore and then even reject the
presumption against preemption and clarity requirement, thereby leaving
the doctrine shorn of those portions that constrained courts from easily,
and against Congress’s intent, overriding state law in areas of traditional
state control. And that is what happened in Geier, as the majority
proceeded to explain why the state law was impliedly preempted.130 It
was clear from the majority’s approach to the applicable principles that
the Court would ultimately preempt state tort actions.
We can see what the Court did in Geier. The question now becomes,
has the Supreme Court continued on that path.
V. THE FUTURE OF THE DOCTRINE AFTER GEIER
What one sees upon an examination of post-Geier preemption
decisions is a doctrine still in disarray. The opinion in Geier sits as an
elephant in the judicial living room, with its absence of articulated
standards standing in stark contrast to the details provided in later
decisions.131 In the final assessment, this Article’s thesis stands: the
Supreme Court will ignore the presumption when it suits its purposes and
will employ obstruction-of-purposes conflict preemption to impliedly
preempt state law that it wishes to neutralize.
One month after the Court decided Geier, it handed down Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council,132 another frustration-of-purposes
conflict preemption case involving a Massachusetts law attempting to
regulate state contracts with those doing business with the country of
Burma.133 Congress, however, enacted a federal law giving the president
plenary power over economic sanctions and power to develop a
“comprehensive, multilateral strategy” with respect to Burma.134 In
determining that the state law indeed posed a conflict with the purposes
of the federal law,135 the Court first properly recited the types of
130. See id. at 874-86.
131. One month before the Court decided Geier on implied preemption grounds, it decided
Norfolk Southern Railway v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000) on express preemption grounds. Even
though the Court similarly provided no details about the preemption doctrine it was applying, it
relied heavily on an earlier preemption case that had interpreted the same statute and had identified
the presumption against preemption. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664
(1993). For a charge that the result in Shanklin is inconsistent with the presumption against
preemption, however, see Davis, supra note 2, at 1004-05.
132. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
133. See id. at 366-67.
134. Id. at 368-69.
135. The Court held: “[b]ecause the state Act’s provisions conflict with Congress’s specific
delegation to the President of flexible discretion, with limitation of sanctions to a limited scope of
actions and actors, and with direction to develop a comprehensive, multilateral strategy under the
federal Act, it is preempted, and its application is unconstitutional, under the Supremacy Clause.” Id.
at 388.
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preemption,136 as it had not in Geier, and even mentioned the
presumption against preemption.137 But because this case touched on
foreign affairs and involved the “plenitude of Executive authority”138 that
Congress gave to the president over these matters regarding Burma, it
was easy to see why the state law conflicted with the federal mandate.
Also because of the subject matter involved, this would have been more
of a case like Locke, implicating an area of traditional federal authority
where the same presumptions against preemption do not apply. Even so,
the Court at least paid some attention to the presumption: “[w]e leave for
another day a consideration in this context of a presumption against
preemption. Assuming, arguendo, that some presumption against
preemption is appropriate, we conclude, based on our analysis below,
that the state Act presents a sufficient obstacle to the full
accomplishment of Congress’s objectives under the federal Act to find it
preempted.”139 This case would not have been an appropriate one for the
presumption; nonetheless, even if the presumption did apply, the Court
said in a footnote that it would find the presumption overcome in this
case. The Crosby Court’s treatment of the presumption comports with
prior law and its ultimate conclusion is supportable on the law. Again, it
is Geier that seems to stand alone.
The next significant preemption decision was Buckman Co. v.
Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee,140 which involved not only implied conflict
preemption but also state tort law. Plaintiffs claimed that in order to get
approval for a medical device, defendant company made fraudulent
representations to the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA” or
“Agency”).141 Plaintiffs were therefore suing defendant company under
state tort law asserting a “fraud-on-the-FDA” theory of liability.142 The
Supreme Court held that the claims were impliedly preempted because
they conflicted with federal law: “the federal statutory scheme amply
empowers the FDA to punish and deter fraud against the Agency, and . . .
this authority is used by the Agency to achieve a somewhat delicate
balance of statutory objectives,”143 which would be frustrated by state

136. Id. at 372-73.
137. See id. at 374 n.8.
138. Id. at 376. In full, the Court stated, “[w]ithin the sphere defined by Congress, then, the
statute has placed the President in a position with as much discretion to exercise economic leverage
against Burma, with an eye toward national security, as our law will admit. And it is just this
plenitude of Executive authority that we think controls the issue of preemption here.” Id. at 375-76.
139. Id. at 374 n.8.
140. 531 U.S. 341 (2001) (hereinafter “Buckman”).
141. Id. at 343.
142. See id. at 347.
143. Id. at 348.
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tort fraud claims.144
The important part of Buckman for the purposes of this Article is
what the Court said from the start of its discussion of the applicable
preemption principles. Rather than merely tout “ordinary pre-emption
principles” without definition as it did in Geier, the Court began this
way:
Policing fraud against federal agencies is hardly ‘a field which the
States have traditionally occupied,’ such as to warrant a presumption
against finding federal pre-emption of a state-law cause of action. To
the contrary, the relationship between a federal agency and the entity it
regulates is inherently federal in character because the relationship
originates from, is governed by, and terminates according to federal
law. . . . Accordingly – and in contrast to situations implicating
‘federalism concerns and the historic primacy of state regulation of
matters of health and safety’ – no presumption against pre-emption
145
obtains in this case.

Immediately thereafter, the Court held that the conflict required
preemption of the tort claim.146
The contrast with Geier is striking. The Buckman Court found the
possible applicability of the presumption significant enough to begin its
discussion with it and to show why it was not applicable. Whether one
ultimately agrees or not that the claims in Buckman frustrate the
objectives of the federal scheme, the fact remains that the Court noted
the existence of the presumption in cases involving historic state police
powers and at least made a case for the presumption’s inapplicability.147
One could charge that the Court reached the result it desired and then
rationalized it by dismissing the presumption as inapplicable; it would
then not have to view the conflict question in a light more favorable to
the plaintiffs’ state-law claims and explain a perhaps less obvious result
regarding conflict. Such a scenario is not impossible, of course. What the
Buckman Court did, however, is much less open to indictment148 than
what it did in Geier, which was to ignore the presumption entirely in a
144. Id.
145. Id. at 347-48 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) and
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
146. See id. at 348.
147. The Court in summary explained that, with their fraud-on-the-FDA claims, the plaintiffs
“would not be relying on traditional state tort law which had predated the federal enactments in
question. On the contrary, the existence of these federal enactments is a critical element in their
case,” in the sense that “the fraud claims exist solely by virtue of the [federal statutory] disclosure
requirements.” Id. at 353. The area therefore is one not of traditional state regulation but of federal
regulation.
148. But see Davis, supra note 2, at 1022 (arguing that the argument for federal primacy in the
field, and thus the case for preemption, was weak in Buckman).
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case in which it clearly applied. After Buckman, then, Geier continued to
stand alone in its apparent rejection of the presumption against
preemption.
One year after Geier, the Supreme Court decided Egelhoff v.
Egelhoff.149 This case implicated the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) with its “clearly expansive”150 express
preemption provision. ERISA preemption applies to “‘supercede any and
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan’ covered by ERISA.”151 The state law at issue
provided that upon divorce, the spouse’s designation as beneficiary of
certain assets would be revoked.152 The Court found that ERISA
expressly preempted the state law because “[t]he [state] statute binds
ERISA plan administrators to a particular choice of rules for determining
beneficiary status. The administrators must pay benefits to the
beneficiaries chosen by state law, rather than to those identified in the
[ERISA] plan documents.”153 The Court’s conclusion rested in part upon
the expansiveness of the “relate to” portion of the preemption
provision.154 But the Court also rested its holding on the state statute’s
interference with ERISA’s goals of national uniformity in employee
benefit plan administration.155 It was able to portray the express
preemption question as one looking just like conflict preemption because
in the past the Court has looked to Congress’s objectives as a guide to
what would be preempted under the “relate to” clause.156
For the purposes of this Article, however, it is significant that the
Court acknowledged the applicability of the presumption against
preemption. In response to an argument that the state statute touched on
two areas of traditional state regulation, family and probate law, the
Court stated that “[t]here is indeed a presumption against preemption in
areas of traditional state regulation such as family law. But that
presumption can be overcome where, as here, Congress has made clear
its desire for pre-emption.”157 One might note that there was no
149. 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
150. Id. at 146 (internal quotation omitted).
151. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a))(emphasis added).
152. Id. at 143.
153. Id. at 147.
154. See id. at 146-47.
155. See id. at 148. Specifically, “[r]equiring ERISA administrators to master the relevant
laws of 50 States and to contend with litigation would undermine the congressional goal of
‘minimizing the administrative and financial burdens’ on plan administrators.” Id. at 149-50 (quoting
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990)).
156. See id. at 147. In fact, the Court concluded that the state law related to or had a
“connection with” ERISA plans because it directly conflicted with ERISA requirements. Id. at 150.
157. Id. at 151 (citation omitted).
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discussion of a savings clause in this case, so the Court had only to
analyze the very broad express preemption provision. From that
perspective, and even assuming the presumption would apply, there
exists some foundation for the Court’s conclusion. Significantly, then,
although the Court ultimately found the presumption overcome because
of the expansive express preemption provision, the Court nonetheless
recognized the presumption’s applicability in this case, again in contrast
to the presumption’s exceedingly conspicuous absence in Geier.
Even more notable, perhaps, than the Egelhoff majority’s
acknowledgment of the presumption is Justice Breyer’s dissenting
opinion, in which he argued in part that the presumption against
preemption counseled strongly against preemption in this case.158 It is
notable because Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion in Geier,159
the one that ignored, even arguably rejected, the presumption in favor of
allusive (and, in Geier, elusive) “ordinary preemption principles.” By
contrast, Justice Breyer appeared to be a champion of the presumption in
Egelhoff. In his view, the “most serious” preemption issue in the case
was whether there existed the obstacle kind of implied conflict
preemption.160 He next recognized that
[i]n answering that [implied conflict preemption] question, we must
remember that petitioner has to overcome a strong presumption against
pre-emption. That is because the Washington statute governs family
property law – a “field of traditional state regulation,” where courts will
not find federal pre-emption unless such was the “‘clear and manifest
purpose of Congress’”161

He concluded that “[n]o one can seriously argue that Congress has
clearly resolved the question before us.”162 In light of his opinion in
Geier, these statements from Justice Breyer are astounding. Not only did
he emphasize that the presumption was against preemption, but he
emphasized that Congress had not clearly manifested its intent to
preempt. Had this emphasis on the presumption and clarity requirement
been brought to bear in Geier, no doubt the result would have been as
Justice Breyer saw it in Egelhoff. His silence in Geier and his emphasis
in Egelhoff support the argument that the Geier majority engaged in
158. See id. at 157 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
159. See 529 U.S. 861, 864 (2000).
160. 532 U.S. at 156.
161. Id. at 157 (quoting New York State Conf. of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995)(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S 218,
230 (1947))).
162. Id. His final conclusion repeated that “the state statute before us is one regarding family
property – a ‘field of traditional state regulation,’ where the interpretive presumption against preemption is particularly strong.” Id. at 161 (quoting New York State Conf. 514 U.S. at 655).
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sleight of hand, ignoring the law to reach the result they desired.
Shortly after Egelhoff, the Supreme Court decided Lorillard Tobacco
Co. v. Reilly.163 The case involved the very intricate preemption issues
raised by the express preemption clauses in the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act (“FCLAA”).164 At issue was the validity of
Massachusetts regulations governing cigarette advertising and sales.165
This case is again distinct from Geier in that the majority at least
identified the presumption and indicated that it applied in this case
implicating an area of traditional state regulation: advertising.166
Although the Court noted the presumption’s applicability, it can be
criticized for failing to heed it. Words of presumption were not
mentioned again, and even when the Court acknowledged that the text of
the express preemption provision was ambiguous,167 it nonetheless
proceeded to reject Massachusetts’ narrow reading of the statute’s
preemption language.168 The presumption would require that narrow
reading and protection of the historic police powers.169 Consistent with
the argument in this Article, then, it appears that the Court here paid lip
service to the presumption, but ignored it when its applicability most
counted, when it would have dictated a different result. The Court
preempted the state law in a field of traditional state regulation and under
an ambiguous express provision.
163. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
164. See id. at 532, 541-42. The text of the provisions read:
“(a) Additional statements
No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by section
1333 of this title, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) State regulations
No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State
law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which
are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.”
Id. at 541 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334).
165. See id. at 532-36.
166. Id. at 541-42 (“[W]e work on the assumption that the historic police powers of the states
are not to be superceded by the Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.”)(internal quotations omitted)(second alteration in original).
167. See id. at 547 (“To be sure, Members of this Court have debated the precise meaning of
‘based on smoking and health’ [in the preemption section]”).
168. See id. (recognizing that the language is debatable and stating “but we cannot agree with
the [state] Attorney General’s narrow construction of the phrase”).
169. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter noted the presumption in a case like this
involving a state’s traditional police power, see id. at 591 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part), and
acknowledged that “our precedents [therefore] require that the Court construe the preemption
provision narrowly. If Congress’ intent to preempt a particular category of regulation is ambiguous,
such regulations are not preempted.” Id. at 591-92 (internal quotations omitted). The dissenters
believed the express preemption provision was ambiguous and that therefore Congress did not make
“clear and manifest” its intention to preempt the regulations at issue. See id. at 598. It is interesting
to note that, as in Egelhoff, Justice Breyer appeared to place such emphasis on the presumption that
he would have declined to preempt the state law when in Geier he wholly ignored the presumption.
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One aspect of the case that works in the majority’s favor is the lack
of a savings clause. This is another way that Lorillard Tobacco is
different from Geier: the Lorillard Tobacco Court did not consider any
savings clause in analyzing the preemptive effect of the FCLAA and so
did not have an extra reason, beyond the presumption, to decline to find
preemption. A savings clause addressing the sort of state regulation at
issue, coupled with the ambiguous preemption provision and the
presumption against preemption, would strongly and affirmatively
indicate that Congress did not intend to preempt state law. Such was the
case in Geier. As it stands, Lorillard Tobacco, because it mentioned but
did not heed the presumption, is not as much of an aberration as Geier.
Most recently, the Court decided Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine,170 in
which it unanimously declined to impliedly preempt state tort actions
against recreational boat manufacturers that failed to equip their boats
with propeller guards.171 For that reason, it is perhaps the most
anomalous of the post-Geier cases. Factually, the case is strikingly
similar to Geier. The federal statute at issue in Sprietsma, the Federal
Boat Safety Act of 1971 (“FBSA”),172 contained express preemption and
savings provisions that are nearly identical to those examined in Geier.173
And just as had occurred in Geier, the plaintiff in Sprietsma had filed a
tort action alleging that the defendant’s product was unreasonably
dangerous because of its lack of a safety device. On the law, the case is
also similar to Geier in terms of its omission of any mention of the
presumption against preemption, even though the case involves a
traditional area of state law to which the presumption has applied. In
light of this ignoring of the presumption, the Court’s unanimous finding
that the state tort claims were not either expressly or impliedly
preempted makes Sprietsma both completely surprising and somewhat of
an aberration. In that way, the case throws another wild card into
preemption doctrine and again leaves lower courts with no consistent
guidance about how to approach these questions.174
170. 537 U.S. ___ (2002), No. 01-706, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 9067 (Dec. 3, 2002).
171. Id. at *6, *25.
172. 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311, cited in Sprietsma, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 9067, at *7.
173. The express preemption provision provides in pertinent part:
[A] State or political subdivision of a State may not establish, continue in effect, or
enforce a law or regulation establishing a recreational vessel or associated equipment
performance or other safety standard or imposing a requirement for associated
equipment . . . that is not identical to a regulation prescribed under . . . this title.
2002 U.S. LEXIS 9067, at *14 (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 4306). The savings clause provides the
following: “Compliance with this chapter or standards, regulations, or orders prescribed under this
chapter does not relieve a person from liability at common law or under State law.”
Id. (quoting 46 U.S.C. § 4311(g)).
174. Indeed, the Supreme Court reversed the Illinois Supreme Court, see id. at *34, which had
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Despite its failure to employ the presumption, the Court did not find
that Congress expressly preempted state common-law claims under the
FBSA. The Court first employed reasoning similar to that used in Geier
but then went further in actually interpreting the words of the express
provision and determining that they did not include common-law
claims.175 The Court also referred to the savings clause to buttress its
conclusion that state law claims were not expressly preempted. And
where in Geier the majority saw a “compliance-with-federal-regulation
precondition” to the savings clause that obscured the plain meaning of
the clause, the Sprietsma Court saw clearer, easier to interpret language
that saved common-law claims. The Sprietsma Court simply did not
engage in the contortions of statutory interpretation that was common in
Geier and thereby reached a more sensible result.
In further opining about the place of state common law in this
statutory scheme, the Sprietsma Court surprisingly added the following:
Our interpretation of the statute’s language does not produce
anomalous results. It would have been perfectly rational for Congress
not to pre-empt common-law claims, which – unlike most
administrative and legislative regulations – necessarily perform an
important remedial role in compensating accident victims. Indeed,
compensation is the manifest object of the saving clause, which focuses
not on state authority to regulate, but on preserving ‘liability at
common law or under State law.’176

The statement is surprising because such a common-sense recognition of
the “rationality” of devising a scheme whereby common law’s remedial
purposes would co-exist with Congress’s safety regulation was nowhere
to be found in Geier. Rather, in Geier, the Court saw a “complex type of
state/federal relationship” that it had “no reason to believe” Congress
would establish.177 That professed disbelief more easily allowed the
Geier Court to find conflict between the state and federal law and, later,
to imply preemption in that manner. The opposite belief articulated in
Sprietsma appears to have influenced its view of conflict in the opposite
direction, such that the Sprietsma Court did not imply preemption. Lower
courts will have difficulty reconciling these views in the two cases,
made an explicit effort to follow the federal district and appellate courts, several of which “have
found preemption, express or implied, in similar propeller guard cases.” Sprietsma v. Mercury
Marine, 757 N.E.2d 75, 85 (Ill. 2001). It should be safe to say that all of those courts will find the
Supreme Court’s result in Sprietsma surprising.
175. See Sprietsma, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 9067, at *21 (stating that “the terms ‘law’ and
‘regulation’ used together in the pre-emption clause indicate that Congress pre-empted only positive
enactments”).
176. Id. at *22-23 (citations omitted).
177. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 872 (2000).
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because the cases themselves are so similar, and will have difficulty
predicting when the Court ultimately will respect Congress’s express
intent to save state tort claims and when it will not.
Whether those difficulties will carry over into the Sprietsma Court’s
implied preemption approach is another question. The Court first
identified the implied preemption principles and then quoted the
statement from Geier that “Congress’ inclusion of an express preemption clause ‘does not bar the ordinary working of conflict preemption principles,’”178 so implied preemption analysis was necessary.
Again despite its failure to recognize the presumption against
preemption, the Court did not imply preemption based on conflict.
Important to the discussion was the fact that the federal authority charged
with regulating in this area, the Coast Guard,179 had chosen not to issue a
federal standard requiring the safety device that the plaintiff in Sprietsma
alleged was necessary to make the product safe.180 The Court found that
“although the Coast Guard’s decision not to require propeller guards
was undoubtedly intentional and carefully considered, it does not convey
an ‘authoritative’ message of a federal policy against propeller guards,”
and therefore the survival of state common-law tort actions based on a
boat’s failure to have the guard would not frustrate the objectives of the
federal scheme or pose an obstacle to Congress’s purposes under the
FBSA.181 Indeed, the Coast Guard had never asserted that common-law
claims would obstruct the federal scheme.182 The Court contrasted this
case with Geier, in which the federal agency had determined that safety
was best achieved through giving manufacturers options among safety
devices, and the agency had asserted in litigation that common-law
claims would disrupt the federal scheme.183 In this regard, the Court’s
decision in Sprietsma makes sense and appears to reach the right, albeit
surprising, result. But again in terms of consistency of doctrine, the
Court’s failure to mention and apply the presumption against preemption
leaves one wondering whether the presumption continues to exist and
influenced the Court’s conflict analysis.

178. Sprietsma, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 9067, at *24.
179. The Secretary of Transportation delegated rulemaking authority to the Coast Guard. Id. at
*12.
180. See id. at *18-20. In Geier, the federal regulatory agency had made a deliberate decision
to give manufacturers options of safety devices from which to choose. See id. at *29.
181. Id. at *28.
182. Id. at *26.
183. Id. at *29.
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When it addressed defendant’s alternate conflict preemption claim
that the statute as a whole occupied the field of regulation and therefore
preempted state common-law remedies, the Court relied on the longstanding principle that Congress’s intent to preempt must be “clear and
manifest.”184 In finding that there was no such clear and manifest intent
on the part of Congress to preempt state tort claims, the Court added,
“Rather, our conclusion that the Act’s express pre-emption clause does
not cover common-law claims suggests the opposite intent.”185 By
linking the discernment of Congress’s “clear and manifest” intent to the
express preemption provision in this way, the Court did what it did not
do in Geier but what this Article argues should be done: not sheer
congressional intent away from the conflict determination by
ascertaining the existence of conflict wholly apart from what the
statutory text indicates about what Congress intended. Sprietsma in this
way begins to restore some sense to preemption doctrine, but whether it
truly will have that restorative function remains to be seen.
At bottom, it appears that the Court defied what it has done of late
because it did not presume preemption. And although it neglected the
presumption against preemption, it appeared to apply the clarity
requirement to one aspect of the case. The Court analyzed the case
straightforwardly, without the contortions in statutory interpretation that
the majority engaged in in Geier, and therefore is somewhat of an
abnormality. How Sprietsma will ultimately affect preemption doctrine
will have to await future analysis.
Apart from the anomalous Sprietsma, what emerges from these postGeier cases is the sense that the Court will acknowledge the presumption
against preemption when the presumption can be said to be inapplicable
or when it ultimately can be overcome by something else in the statute.
In a case like Geier in which the presumption would have made a
difference, because there was an ambiguous express preemption
provision and a very clear, unambiguous clause saving state tort claims,
the Court ignored the presumption completely, and indeed ignored the
details of preemption doctrine itself, choosing instead to find some
obstruction of federal purposes. The absence of principles to support the
Geier decision remains telling, exposing the Court to a charge that it is
engaging in sleight of hand to reach its desired result. But what,
ultimately, is that desired result, or why does the Court go to the lengths
it does to skirt the rules and displace state law in favor of federal law?
The impetuses may be several, ranging from a potentially laudable goal

184. Id. at *32.
185. Id. at *32-33.
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of ensuring uniformity of law application to national product
manufacturers, to a disguised goal of achieving tort reform that could not
be had, or had not been effected, another way.186 Because the Court is at
times using indiscernible doctrine that can also obscure motivation, it is
difficult to state definitively what is driving its approaches and urging it
to conclusions displacing state law. But assuredly, it is vigorously
displacing state law, and the presumption against preemption has at times
been an inconvenient obstacle to that end. Given the post-Geier cases’
reiterations of the principle, however, perhaps one cannot say that Geier
entirely eradicated the presumption. Perhaps the most that one can say is
that the presumption exists in name only; otherwise, its applicability and
even the acknowledgment of its existence are dependent on the whims of
the Court and the Court’s desired outcome in any particular case.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has dissected the Court’s opinion in Geier v. American
Honda Motor, noting where the Court diverged from traditional
principles and identifying the inconsistencies inherent in some of its
analysis. Those inconsistencies, the Court’s ignoring of provisions that
would change its analysis, and its ignoring of the very preemption
principles it purported to apply but never did, all coalesce to betray the
Court’s purpose. That purpose appears to be to achieve a version of tort
reform through the vehicle of judicial preemption,187 and the Court is
enabled in that goal by obstruction-of-purposes conflict preemption. In
taking the approach it did, the Court demonstrated the dangers posed by
the obstruction-of-purposes type of conflict preemption and courts’
overuse of it in contradiction to the presumption against preemption. The
Court overrode state tort law through the malleable obstacle implied
preemption approach in the face of a command from Congress that any
person could still bring any common law claim against someone subject
to and even in compliance with the Act. It is no coincidence that “[a]ll of
the Federal Circuit Courts that have considered the question . . . have

186. See Davis, supra note 2, at 1017 (also giving the Justices’ politics as one explanation for
their preference for federal law over state tort law).
187. Cf. id. (observing that “the Justices are, for the most part, conservative and their
conservatism is more fiercely directed against state tort law than for notions of federalism”); id. at
970 (noting the difficulty in resisting the strong temptation to attribute the Court’s preemption
approach to the Justices’ politics); David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and
Politics of Federal Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1130
(stating that both ideological predispositions and legal and factual contexts play roles in preemption
decision making, but also noting that, “[g]iven the prevalence of Republicans on the federal bench,
the influence of policy preferences and regulatory philosophy on these decisions helps to explain the
modern preemption doctrine’s hostility to state and local regulation”).
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found pre-emption”188 on the facts of Geier while state courts, which
presumably have an interest in not lightly implying the override of state
law, have not.
The presumption against preemption and the clarity requirement,
borne of federalism principles cognizant of the need to respect state
sovereignty, were adopted to protect against this very danger of easy
override. The danger is greatest when courts can, under other parts of
preemption doctrine, roam at large around the federal statute and around
state law to divine any federal purpose that state law might frustrate.
Despite the presumption’s appearance in several Supreme Court cases
post-Geier, its viability remains an open question. Indeed, obstacle
implied preemption may effectively constitute a presumption that
prevails in the opposite direction, that is in favor of federal law. Only one
recent case casts any doubt on that assertion.189 The Court should revisit
this issue and clearly reaffirm the presumption against preemption and
the clarity requirement in cases like Geier, where it is appropriate and
necessary, and not just in those cases where the presumption is irrelevant
or insignificant. The Court would then clarify preemption doctrine and
continue the tradition of respecting state sovereignty in our federalist
system.

188. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 864 (2000).
189. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 9067

